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Torts
By RICHARD C. AusNEss*
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Negligence Per Se
The concept of negligence presupposes a uniform standard
of human behavior by which a defendant's action can be mea-
sured. The familiar "reasonable man" test embodies this prin-
ciple.' Because a community standard is involved, evidence of
usual and customary conduct sometimes may be relevant to
the issue of due care. In Kentucky, however, a custom must be
"certain, definite, uniform and notorious" to establish a stan-
dard of due care.' Legislation, which requires or prohibits a
particular act, may also establish the standard of care. Accord-
ingly, the unexcused violation 3 of a statute or ordinance4 de-
signed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included 5 against a risk of harm which has in fact occurred' is
negligence per se.7 As the Court of Appeals declared recently
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, Uni-
versity of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
I Seavy, Negligence-Subjective or Objective, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9 (1927). See
generally Reynolds, The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report in the
"Odious Creature", 23 OKLA. L. REv. 410 (1970).
2 Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968); fllinois Cent. R.R.
v. Maxwell, 167 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1943).
3 Normally, the defendant is required to make a reasonable effort to obey the
statute in question. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 288A (1965); Satterlee v. Or-
ange Glenn School Dist., 177 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1947).
See Blackwell's Adm'r v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 265 S.W.2d 462 (Ky.
1954); Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas, 209 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1947); Kepner, Violation
of a Municipal Ordinance as Negligence Per Se in Kentucky, 37 Ky. L.J. 358 (1949).
Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Cooper v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 321 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1959); Vissman v. Koby, 309 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1958);
RESTAkTEmEN (SECOND) OF ToRS § 288 (1965).
, Wagers v. Frantz, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1969); Brown Hotel v. Levitt, 209
S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1948); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Sloan, 155 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1941);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
7 The standard of conduct is fixed by the legislature and the jury is not permitted
to substitute its own judgment in this respect. See REsTAnmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
288B (1965). However, it is often a jury question as to whether the defendant's violation
of the statute was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Higgins Inv., v. Sturgill,
509 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1974). Unless the statute violated imposes strict liability, the
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in Blakeman v. Joyce,8 customary conduct which constitutes a
violation of a statute will still be deemed negligent.
In the Blakeman case a motorcyclist brought an action for
injuries suffered in a collision with an automobile. The plaintiff
was preparing to make a right turn into a driveway when he
was struck by the defendant's automobile, while the defendant
was attempting to pass on the right shoulder of the road. The
Court held that the defendant had violated Kentucky Revised
Statutes § 189.340(1) [hereinafter cited as KRS], which re-
quires vehicles to pass on the left, and rejected the argument
that usage and custom on that particular road allowed the
defendant to pass on the right? Applying the doctrine of negli-
gence per se, the Court held that the defendant was negligent
as a matter of law and affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. This
decision is consistent with the weight of authority which holds
that customary conduct will not override the effect of a stat-
ute.10
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable when the
defendant has full control over the instrumentality which
caused the injury, and the accident, according to the common
knowledge and experience of mankind, could not have hap-
pened if those having control and management had not been
defendant is merely required to exercise due care. In such cases, he may raise the
defense of contributory negligence if the plaintiff fails to exercise due care on his own
behalf. Thus, the statute sets the standard of care required of the defendant, but does
not lower the degree of care required by the plaintiff. Bennett v. Parkway Professional
Center, Inc., 507 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1974).
511 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1974).
Id. at 113. See also Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1974), in which
the Court examined the relationship between Ky. Rav. STAT. § 189.340(1) (1970) [here-
inafter cited as KRS], which also provides that the operator of an overtaking vehicle
sound his horn before passing, and KRS § 189.340(2) which allows vehicles on a four-
lane highway to pass on the right. Overruling Fuson v. Van Bebber, 454 S.W.2d
111 (Ky. 1970) and Deason v. Odem, 453 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1970), the Court held that
the hornsounding requirements of KRS § 189.340(1) were inapplicable to vehicles
passing on the right pursuant to the provisions of KRS § 189.340(2). The Court,
therefore, held that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law
for failing to sound his horn under these circumstances.
10 See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Wusich, 375 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1962);
Lemke v. Mueller, 166 N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Cox, 301 P.2d 649 (Okla.
1956). See also 21 AM. JuR. 2D Customs and Usages § 15 (1965).
[Vol. 63
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negligent." Although proof by the defendant of proper care will
not usually destroy the inference of negligence raised by the
circumstances of the case,12 sometimes it may be so overwhelm-
ing that a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for the defendant is justified.13 Such a case, Embry v.
Henderson,14 came before the Court of Appeals last year.
In Embry the plaintiff, who was struck by a screwdriver
thrown from a rotary-type power lawnmower, sued the
lawnmower operator, the owner of the property involved and
his tenant. The plaintiff attempted to rely on res ipsa loquitur,
but the defendant testified that he had inspected the yard prior
to mowing it and had picked up all visible debris. The Court
held that the uncontested evidence of defendant's careful
inspection of the yard prior to mowing was sufficient to estab-
lish the exercise of reasonable care and to rebut any inference
of negligence arising from the nature of the accident. 5
C. Legal Duty of Occupant of Land to Licensee
The concept of "duty" serves as a limitation on the liabil-
ity of owners and occupiers of land. The traditional approach
categorizes persons entering land as trespassers, licensees, or
invitees and graduates accordingly the legal duty owed by the
possessor of the land."8 During 1974 the Court of Appeals an-
" Vernon's Adm'r v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. 1960). In most jurisdictions
res ipsa loquitur creates an inference of negligence. Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Multi-
ple Defendants: Time for Bethrothal, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 311, 314 (1974). Its procedural
effect in Kentucky, however, is somewhat unclear. Lawson, The Law of Presumptions:
A Look at Confusion, Kentucky Style, 57 Ky. L.J. 7, 30-34 (1968). See Mix's Ex'r v.
Smith, 387 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1965); Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley, 375 S.W.2d 696 (Ky.
1964); Lee's Adm'r v. Tucker's Adm'r, 365 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963); Kentucky Home
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1961).
11 Vernon's Adm'r v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1960); Lewis v. Wolk, 228
S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1950).
11 Dunning v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 109 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1937).
" 511 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1974).
" A recent Indiana decision, Stayton v. Funkhouser, 263 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. App.
1970), resembles Embry. In Stayton, the plaintiff was injured by an object thrown from
a rotary lawnmower. The appellate court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant
because he had no knowledge of any objects in his yard that might be propelled by
the mower.
" A trespasser is one who comes upon the land without any legal right to do so.
As noted in the text, a licensee is one who enters upon the land with the consent of
the occupant. An invitee is one who comes upon the land because of business which
concerns the occupier. Bowers v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1971).
1975]
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nounced in Hardin v. Harris, 7 a new approach to the legal duty
owed to licensees.
A licensee is one who enters upon land with the consent of
the occupant. Originally, the possessor of land owed no duty to
a licensee other than to refrain from exposing the licensee to
wanton or willful injury and to warn him of known defects. 8
The Kentucky Court first departed from this traditional and
somewhat harsh rule of limited duty to licensees by distin-
guishing between "active" and "passive" negligence. 9 In
Sage's Administrator v. Creech Coal Co.2" the Court equated
"active" negligence with "willful and wanton" conduct, a well
established exception to the rule of limited liability. However,
the terms "active" and "passive" were soon used to distinguish
injuries which resulted from negligence in conducting business
activity upon the premises from those which occurred because
the defendant failed to warn of latent defects on the property.
21
In Hardin v. Harris22 the Court of Appeals expressly
adopted the "modern view" enunciated by the Restatement of
Torts that the duty of landowners to licensees is that of due
care with respect to business activities conducted on their
property.? The plaintiff in the Hardin case, a 9-year-old child,
was injured on a dairy farm when a feed grinder was acciden-
tally backed over him by a farm employee. The boy's father
was also a farm employee and the child was considered to be a
licensee by the Court. The trial court dismissed a suit against
The possessor of land owes no duty to a trespasser other than to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to the trespasser after his position of peril is discovered and to
refrain from exposing him to wanton or willful injury. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Vander-
pool, 496 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1973); Dykes v. Alexander, 411 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1967). The
possessor of land owes a duty of ordinary care to invitees which may require him to
inspect the premises in order to discover latent dangerous conditions. Creech v.
Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1973); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 479 S.W.2d
623 (Ky. 1972); Ferrell v. Hellems, 408 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1966). See generally James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144
(1953).
, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1974).
" Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, 339 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1960).
"Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Stacy, 164 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1942); Rabe v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 227 S.W. 166 (Ky. 1921).
240 S.W. 42 (Ky. 1922).
21 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Blevins, 293 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1956); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Page, 263 S.W. 20 (Ky. 1924).
2 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1974).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O TORTS § 341 (1965).
[Vol. 63
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the owner and manager of the farm, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the defendants had a duty to conduct
their farming activities with reasonable care for the safety of
the child.
The Hardin decision does not change the actual duty of
care imposed on a possessor of land; it merely adopts the more
straightforward approach of the Restatement, thereby elimi-
nating the distinction between "active" and "passive" negli-
gence. Nevertheless, the case does point out the need for a
reexamination of this problem. Beginning with Rowland v.
Christian,24 a 1968 California case, a number of jurisdictions
have abolished the distinctions between trespasser, licensee
and invitee insofar as they affect the landowner's duty of care.25
The increasing strength of this trend indicates that the policies
upon which the rule of limited liability was predicated in the
nineteenth century are no longer in accord with modern social
and economic realities."
D. Parental Liability for Acts of Children
The Restatement of Torts declares that it is negligence to
permit a third person to use a thing which is under the control
of the defendant if he knows or should know that such person
is likely to use the thing in such a manner as to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others.27 Furthermore, it is negli-
gent to place loaded firearms within the reach of young chil-
dren."5 Spivey v. Sheeler9 involved a 12-year-old boy who was
shot by an 11-year-old companion. A negligence action was
brought against the parents of the companion on the theory
that the parents had been negligent in failing to secure the gun.
24 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
2' See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 474 P.2d 796 (1970), aff'd, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971);
Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969). See also Mounsey v. Ellard,
297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972); Heald
v. Cox, 480 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App. 1972); Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970).
2 James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63
Yu z L.J. 144, 146 (1953); Comment, Land Occupant's Liability to Invitees, Licensees
and Trespassers, 31 TENN. L. Rsv. 485 (1964).
21 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 308 (1965).
" REsTATmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 308, comment b (1965). See Glean v. Smith,
156 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. 1967); Wroth v. McKinney, 373 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1962).
514 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1974).
1975]
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The evidence showed that the children had obtained the pistol
from the defendants' locked gun case by using a key found on
top of the cabinet. The Court of Appeals reversed a directed
verdict for the defendants, holding that one who possesses an
extremely dangerous instrumentality must take exceptional
precautions to prevent injury and that children are-entitled to
a degree of care proportional to their ability to foresee and
avoid the perils that may be encountered.
In concluding that the case should have been submitted to
the jury, the Court distinguished Dick v. Higgason,30 a case in
which the operator of a salvage yard was sued when the child
of an employee shot a bystander. An unloaded rifle was stored
in the defendant's private office behind a desk, and cartridges
were kept in an unlocked desk drawer. In the defendant's ab-
sence, the child entered the office, discovered the rifle and
cartridges, and engaged in target practice, wounding a person
in an adjacent lot. The Court held for the defendant, noting
that the child was under the control of his father, not the defen-
dant, and was not expected to enter the office. In contrast, the
defendant in Spivey had a duty to supervise the child; he knew
that the child had access to the house; and the gun was left
loaded and in full view of the child and his friends. The risk of
harm was thus far greater in Spivey than it was in the Dick
case.
The reasoning in Spivey v. Sheeler appears sound. The law
of torts has a deterrent as well as a compensatory function.
Society can encourage the prevention of accidents by placing
liability on the person who is best able to modify his behavior
in order to reduce accident costs." Clearly, the parents who
displayed the loaded guns were better able to prevent the acci-
dent than the child who actually did the shooting.
E. Last Clear Chance
There are four distinct situations in which the last clear
chance doctrine might be utilized: (1) where the plaintiff is
helpless, but the defendant is aware of the danger; (2) where
- 322 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1959).
3, Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Lawson, 240 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1951); G.
CALBREsi, TI COST OF AccwaENTs 135-140 (1970); 57 Am. JUR. 2D Negligence §§ 391-
94 (1971).
[Vol. 63
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the plaintiff is helpless, and the defendant is unaware of the
danger; (3) where the plaintiff in inattentive, but the defen-
dant is aware of the danger; and (4) where the plaintiff is
inattentive and the defendant is also unaware of the danger.
32
The first category is known as "conscious last clear
chance," or the "doctrine of discovered peril." The plaintiff's
prior negligence has placed him in a position from which he is
powerless to extricate himself, and the defendant discovers his
danger while there is still time to avoid it, but fails to take any
action on the plaintiff's behalf. There must be proof that the
defendant actually discovered the plaintiff's condition, and
had sufficient time to take effective action to save him.
3
The second situation is an example of "unconscious last
clear chance." The plaintiff is again helpless, but the defen-
dant does not discover his danger in time to avoid the injury,
although with proper care he could have done so.
In the third situation the plaintiff is able to escape, but
due to negligence has failed to discover his peril. Nevertheless,
most courts will hold the defendant liable, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's continuing contributory negligence, if the defendant
discovers the plaintiffs danger, and negligently fails to save
him.
The final situation is one in which neither party discovers
the plaintiff's peril, although either could have done so by the
exercise of care. Only Missouri, in what is called the "humani-
tarian doctrine," utilizes last clear chance to permit the plain-
tiff to recover in this situation. 4
Kentucky has allowed the use of the last clear chance doc-
trine in the first three situations,35 but, as illustrated by the
recent case of Beasley v. Standard Paving & Engineering Co.,
36
the Court of Appeals refuses to allow use of the doctrine in the
W. PRoSSER, TiE LAW OF ToRs § 66 (4th ed. 1971).
13 Feistritzer v. Lister, 401 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1966); Skees v. Whitaker, 398 S.W.2d
715 (Ky. 1966). See also Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. Wood, 392 S.W.2d 437
(Ky. 1965).
McCall v. Thompson, 155 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1941); Womack v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 88 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1935). See Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri,
20 ST. Louis L. REV. 113 (1935).
- Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1971); French v. Mozzali, 433
S.W.2d 122 (Ky. 1968); Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1952).
- 511 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1974). See also General Tel. Co. v. Yount, 482 S.W.2d 567
(Ky. 1972).
1975]
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fourth situation. In Beasley, an inspector for the State Depart-
ment of Highways sought to recover from a contractor for inju-
ries sustained when the plaintiff's hand was crushed by con-
struction machinery. The defendant was using a mobile crane
to lay concrete sewer pipe. Four retractable hydraulic outrig-
gers or stabilizers were used to stabilize the crane during this
operation. When retracted, the two front outriggers came to
rest against a large bumper which ran across the front of the
crane. As the outrigger was being retracted, the plaintiff's hand
was caught between the bumper and outrigger. There was no
evidence that the operator of the crane actually knew that
Beasley had his hand on the bumper in the place of danger.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a mat-
ter of law and refused to allow submission of the case to the jury
on a theory of last clear chance. This decision was affirmed on
appeal. Assuming that the plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent in standing with his back to the crane and resting his hand
on the bumper, the facts of the case seem to fall within the
fourth category discussed above. The plaintiff negligently
placed himself in a position of danger which neither he nor the
defendant discovered, because both failed to exercise due care.
Although the Court's decision in Beasley is doctrinally
sound, it illustrates the harshness of the contributory negli-
gence defense. Both the plaintiff and the defendant contrib-
uted to the accident, but the loss was placed entirely on the
victim. Perhaps a comparative negligence approach would bet-
ter satisfy the compensation function of tort law as well as




The law of products liability is concerned with the alloca-
3 Many commentators have criticized the last clear chance doctrine as concep-
tually unsound, confusing and often unfair. See, e.g., James, Last Clear Chance: A
Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, (1938); MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1225 (1940). Much of this condemnation, however, is
rooted in a dislike of contributory negligence. A move toward a comparative negligence
approach is often recommended. See Maloney, From Contributory, to Comparative
Negligence: A Needed Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. Rev. 135 (1958); Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MicOH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
[Vol. 63
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tion of losses resulting from injuries caused by the use or con-
sumption of manufactured products. Despite its obvious defi-
ciencies, for many years negligence provided plaintiffs with
their only basis for recovery against the sellers of defective
products.38 Later, express and implied warranty theories were
also utilized for this purpose. 9 Today, these approaches have
been largely superceded by strict liability in tort."
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts is the source of
the strict liability theory. It imposes strict liability on one who
sells goods which are defective or unreasonably dangerous due
to either improper manufacture or improper design. 1 The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals first recognized the strict liability ap-
proach in Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing Co.
42
and has since applied the theory in a number of products liabil-
ity cases .
3
The public policy consideration most widely accepted as
the primary justification for strict liability is "cost spread-
ing."44 According to this rationale, the manufacturer can
" See James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 192 (1955); Keeton, Products
Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965); Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960).
31 See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402.4 and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439 (1969); Franklin, When Worlds Collide:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974
(1966); Comment, The Contractual Aspects of Consumer Protection: Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1430 (1966).
,1 See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
"1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also Keeton, Manu-
facturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 Symcus L. REv. 559 (1969). The Kentucky Court of Appeals examined
the problem of design defects in Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky.
1973). See Comment, Products Liability: Is § 402A Strict Liability Really Strict in
Kentucky?, 62 KY. L.J. 866 (1974). See also Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufac-
turers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLum. L. REv. 1531
(1974).
42 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
0 E.g., Post v. American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968);
Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967).
11 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 517-27 (1961); Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in
Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 635-36 (1971). Another concept is
"enterprise liability." Under this theory, it is argued that an industry or activity should
pay for injuries that it causes. See James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability, 27
N.Y.U.L. REv. 537 (1952); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity,
1975]
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spread accident costs to consumers by means of higher prices.
However, arguments based on considerations of efficiency have
also been offered in support of the imposition of losses on man-
ufacturers by means of strict liability." Proponents of the strict
liability doctrine contend that losses caused by defective prod-
ucts should be placed upon the party who, by changing his
behavior, can most easily reduce the costs of accidents and of
accident prevention.46 The cases discussed below will touch
upon these considerations in discussing three aspects in prod-
ucts liability law: (1) the burden of proof, (2) misuse and alter-
ation of the product, and (3) the applicability of strict liability
principles to bystander injuries.
A. The Burden of Proof
In every products liability case the plaintiff must prove the
existence of a defect in the product," that the product was
defective when it left the hands of the defendant," and finally,
that this defect caused the injuries involved.49 Proof of these
basic elements has presented plaintiffs with their most difficult
problems in strict liability cases. It is probable that more cases
are lost by plaintiffs because the existence of the defect has not
been proved, or has not been connected with the eventual in-
jury, than for any other reason."
In Midwestern V. W. Corp. v. Ringley,51 the purchaser of a
new automobile brought suit against the manufacturer and the
dealer for damages sustained when the vehicle skidded and
struck a telephone pole. Based on evidence that the right-front
61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952); Note, Expanding Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 1084 (1969).
See McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implications, 38 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
3 (1970).
11 Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?,
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 429 (1968); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
,1 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRmEDMAN, PRODUCTS Lmurry § 16A(4) (e) (1974); 1 R. HUESH,
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODuCrs Ltmrry § 1.3 (1961); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 8 (1973).
48 Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 855, 858 (1963); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 1079 (1973).
" W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (4th ed. 1971).
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
51 503 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1973).
[Vol. 63
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brake drum was "out of round" as a result of defective manu-
facture, the trial court submitted the case to the jury on a strict
liability theory and a verdict for the plaintiff was given. The
Court of Appeals reversed, however, because it found no evi-
dence that the defect was the probable cause of the accident.
The Court declared that, even under the strict liability theory,
the plaintiff must submit proof of causation in order to recover.
Although the jury can draw inferences from the existence of the
defect itself, the plaintiff is required to introduce evidence suf-
ficient to support a reasonable inference that the defect was the
probable cause of the accident, and not merely a possible
cause.
Kentucky, like most jurisdictions, has required the plain-
tiff to establish each element of his case, including that of
causation, by a preponderance of the evidence.52 For example,
in Briner v. General Motors Corp.,53 where the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident caused by a defective steer-
ing mechanism, it was unclear whether the condition was the
result of a manufacturing defect or subsequent negligent re-
pair. The accident occurred almost two years after the date of
purchase. The Court concluded that the evidence must indi-
cate a probable cause, as distinguished from a possible cause,
and ruled for the defendant.
In deciding Ringley the Court distinguished Gairdy Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Brannon,54 a case in which the plaintiff was able
to satisfy his burden of proof on the issue of causation. In
Gairdy Motors the plaintiff was injured by an automobile re-
cently sold by the defendant to a third party. The plaintiff
introduced evidence showing that there was grease on the brake
drum which was sufficient to cause the brake failure. Because
the buyer had just purchased the vehicle and had driven it only
a few blocks, the jury was permitted to find that the defendant
had failed to use reasonable care to discover and repair the
defective brakes, and that this had contributed to the accident.
Thus, the Court was able to distinguish Gairdy Motors based
on the brief interval of time between the purchase of the car
" See Huffman v. SS. Mary & Elizabeth Hosp., 475 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. 1972);
Holbrook v. Rose, 458 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1970).
461 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. 1971).
268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954).
1975]
HeinOnline  -- 63 Ky. L.J. 763 1974-1975
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and the accident and on the absence of any explanation for the
mechanical failure.
Allocation of the burden of proof in products liability cases
has significant policy aspects with respect to the efficient allo-
cation of resources.5 The manufacturer should be held liable
only when he has placed a defective product on the market."
However, if plaintiffs are required to sustain a heavy burden
of proof in order to recover, many legitimate claims will be
defeated, manufacturers' failure costs will be deceptively low,
and consumer protection will not be maximized. 7 If loss-
spreading is more important, public policy would dictate that
the loss be placed on the best loss-spreader, which is usually
the manufacturer rather than an individual consumer."
In some states, the burden of proof is shifted to the defen-
dant once the plaintiff has proven the existence of a defect.59
Although this approach is perhaps too favorable to the plain-
tiff, the present Kentucky position on the burden of proof, as
manifested by the Ringley case, may be unnecessarily severe.
An approach which allows a plaintiff to meet his burden of
proof on the issue of causation by relatively weak or indirect
evidence is justified by the realities of products liability litiga-
tion. Normally, the manufacturer knows considerably more
about the nature and manufacturing history of the product
than the plaintiff. From its testing and market experience the
manufacturer is better able to determine what is likely to go
wrong with his product. In addition, experts are often more
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff."0
See Note, Products Liability and the Problem of Proof, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1777,
1781 (1969).
56 Id. at 1779.
' Id. at 1781.
Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887 (1967). However, the manufac-
turer's ability to spread losses depends upon the market condition in his industry.
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 517-27 (1961).
1, See, e.g., Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967). See
also Note, Circumstantial Evidence in Strict Products Liability Actions, 1972 WASH.
U.L.Q. 804 (1972).
1* Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. Rav. 325, 343
(1971).
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B. Misuse and Alteration of the Product
A manufacturer is generally not liable for injuries caused
by the plaintiff's abnormal use of a product." This rule, which
has its basis in proximate cause concepts, assumes that the
seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his product. Like-
wise, unauthorized alteration of a product may absolve the
manufacturer of liability. 2 Section 402A of the Restatement
imposes strict liability only if the product "is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold. 6 3 Furthermore, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the product was in a defective
condition at the time it left the control of the seller.
4
Both of these factors were involved in Cox v. General Mo-
tors Corp."' The plaintiffs in the Cox case were injured when
the automobile in which they were riding was struck by a wheel
which had broken off another automobile. The plaintiff
brought suit against the manufacturer of the automobile on a
theory of strict liability. It appeared that a previous owner had
made substantial modifications on the automobile in question,
including the substitution of 15-inch wheels for 14-inch wheels,
and that some of the equipment, including the wheels, had not
been designed by the manufacturer for this particular model.
The Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict for the
defendant, declaring:
The evidence conclusively shows that the automobile being
driven by Brown had been badly mishandled, as well as mo-
dified. It was necessary for the parties to introduce evidence
that the wheel came off the automobile as a proximate result
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965); Epstein,
Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267;
Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in
Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 95 (1972).
62 See O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968); Westemberg v. School
Dist. No. 792, 148 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.
2d 113 (Miss. 1966); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FnXUMAN, PRODUCTS LmnrrV § 16A [4] at 3-
301 (1974); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965).
"Id. at comment g.
514 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1974).
"Id. at 200.
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of a design defect and not as a result of the subsequent mis-
handling and modification.66
Cox is in accord with the weight of authority, although the
comments made earlier concerning the plaintiff's burden of
proof apply with equal force to situations such as this, where
alteration or misuse of the product is involved.
C. Liability to Bystanders
The issue of whether the manufacturer or seller is liable to
a nonuser -who is injured by a defective product is still very
much an open question in this country.67 Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts, which expressly applies only to "users"
or "consumers," includes a caveat stating that the Institute
"expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this
Section may not apply. . . to harm to persons other than users
or consumers .... "68
The Kentucky Court has not yet expressly ruled on the
application of the strict liability concept to bystander
situations," -' although a federal court construing Kentucky law
in a diversity case refused to allow a bystander to recover.
However, a recent case, Ford Motor Co. v. Zipper,7" suggests
that bystanders may recover under a strict liability theory. In
that case, the plaintiff was struck from behind by an automo-
bile driven by one of the defendants. The plaintiff brought suit
on a strict liability theory against the driver, the retail seller
and the manufacturer of the automobile. At trial, the jury
found that the accident was caused solely by brake failure due
to a manufacturing defect in the automobile. Judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. Most of the issues discussed
in the case dealt with matters of evidence, and the defendant
'1 See Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38
TENN. L. REv. 1 (1970); Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in
Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 625 (1971); Note, Strict Products
Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLum. L. Rev. 916 (1964).
68 RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A, caveat (1965).
6"-' Editor's note. Since this article was written, the Court decided Embs v. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., C.A. No. 12,263 (May 23, 1975) which extended the protections of
§ 402A to bystanders.
69 Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Ky. 1968).
7' 502 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1973).
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did not argue that strict liability under Section 402A could not
extend to bystanders.
Beginning with Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.,71 de-
cided in 1965, a substantial number of jurisdictions have ex-
tended strict liability to bystanders.7 The leading case, Elmore
v. American Motors Corp.,73 a 1969 California decision, justi-
fied its holding on the ground that the manufacturer was a
better cost-spreader than the victim.7 4 However, the imposition
of strict liability on manufacturers for injuries to bystanders





The Court of Appeals recently examined the criminal and
civil aspects of public nuisances in Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn
Mining Co.71 In that case residents of Johnson County sought
to enjoin the use of overweight coal trucks on state roads. The
defendant, Terry Elkhorn Mining Company, operated a sur-
face mine in the area and transported its coal over public high-
ways to nearby tipples. The loaded coal trucks sometimes ex-
ceeded the highway load limits by almost 50,000 pounds.7 7 Con-
sequently, sections of the blacktop surface of several highways
were completely destroyed.7 Furthermore, the trucks were ov-
erloaded to the extent that coal spilled off the beds of the
71 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965).
72 See Comment, Misuse as a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict Products
Liability, 10 HOUSTON L. Rgv. 1106, 1115 (1973).
73 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969). See also Preissman v. Ford Motor Co., 82
Cal. Rptr. 108 (Cal. App. 1969); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 79 Cal. Rptr.
194 (Cal. App. 1969).
7' 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657, 451 P.2d at 89. See Note, Strict Products Liability and the
Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 916, 935 (1964).
75 See Comment, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common
Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. Rav. 625, 641 (1971).
71 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1973).
2 Employees of the Department of Motor Transportation testified that they have
never weighed a truck on either of these highways which was not overweight. On some
occasions the trucks were so heavily overloaded that the scales being used sank into
the asphalt pavement. Id. at 714.
7' Portions of state highways 302 and 1107 at the time of the trial consisted mostly
of "red dog," a byproduct of surface mining. Id.
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trucks and onto the highways and shoulders of the roads.79
Although many of the truckers were indicted for operating
overweight vehicles, none had ever been convicted of that of-
fense in Johnson County.
The plaintiffs brought suit on the theory that continued
operation of overweight coal trucks constituted a public nuis-
ance. 0 The landowners alleged that the destruction of the high-
ways posed a continuing threat to public safety, and also con-
tended that they had suffered special injuries because their
homes were damaged by vibrations and dust from the trucks.
The trial court upheld the validity of special overweight
truck permits obtained by the defendant from the Highway
Department and refused to enjoin further violations of load
limit regulations. The lower court also denied a motion by the
state Attorney General to intervene in the proceeding. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that a public
nuisance existed and that the landowners were entitled to in-
junctive relief. The Court further concluded that the issuance
of the overweight truck permits was invalid8' and upheld the
Attorney General's right to intervene.
Public or common nuisances are a diverse group of minor
7' This spillage violates KRS § 189.150.
The plaintiffs also contended, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that they were
entitled to injunctive relief under KRS § 281.790. 503 S.W.2d at 720. KRS § 281.790
provides:
At the instance of motor transportation or of any person having an interest
in the subject matter, the courts of this state may enjoin any person from
violating any of the provisions of this chapter or other chapters relating to
the operation or taxation of motor vehicles, or any order, rule, regulation, or
requirement of the department relating to such vehicles.
S, Pursuant to its authority under KRS § 189.222, the Highway Department had
imposed a weight limit of 24,000 pounds on the roads in question. After this case was
filed the defendant obtained a series of special overweight permits which could be
issued "for stated periods, special purposes and unusual conditions, and upon such
terms in the interest of public safety and the preservation of highways as the depart-
ment may, in its discretion, require." KRS § 189.270(2). The Court concluded that this
statute was designed to take care of emergency or unusual situations only, and could
not be used by a person in the day-to-day operation of a business. 503 S.W.2d at 718.
See also Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 56 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1932). The
Court also found that the Highway Department had failed to observe its own regula-
tions when it issued the overweight permits to Terry Elkhorn. See Regulation HIWA-
TC-P1(2). It is noteworthy that the Department's power to issue overweight permits
has been altered and, in general, constricted by the enactment of KRS § 189.271 by
the 1974 General Assembly.
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criminal offenses which involve some interference with the in-
terests of the community or the comfort and safety of the gen-
eral public.82 The entire community need not be actually af-
fected, however, as long as the condition interferes with the
exercise of a public right. Although a public nuisance is nor-
mally treated as a criminal offense, the government may also
pursue a civil remedy. Moreover, since the sixteenth century, 3
private individuals have been allowed to maintain tort actions
when they suffer damage from a public nuisance which differs
from that suffered by the general public.
8'
In the Hancock case it was undisputed that portions of the
highway were virtually destroyed, making travel by the public
both hazardous and inconvenient. 5 The allegations of the
landowners with respect to interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of their property met the requirements of the special
damages rule. The only question was whether the issuance of
overweight truck permits by the Highway Department legitim-
ized what would otherwise be a public nuisance under the
theory that, generally, no act carried on in a customary manner
may be deemed a public nuisance if it is legislatively author-
ized." In this case, however, the Court found that because the
overweight permits issued by the Highway Department were
invalid, they would not immunize the defendant from liability.
The Court in Hancock also recognized the Attorney Gen-
eral's right to intervene. KRS § 15.020, which designates the
Attorney General as the chief law officer of the Commonwealth
and enumerates the powers and duties of that office, also pro-
vides that the Attorney General may exercise "all common law
' Maum v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1973); W. PRossEa, LAW OF
Tors § 88, at 583 (4th ed. 1971).
'u Fowler v. Sanders, 79 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1618); Williams' Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
163, 164-65 (K.B. 1592). The first reported case, Southall v. Dagger, appeared in Y.B.
Mich. 27 Hen. 8, pl. 10 (1535); a translation can be found in Smith, Private Action for
Obstruction to Public Right of Passage, 15 COLUM. L. Rav. 142 n.65 (1915).
" East Cairo Ferry Co. v. Brown, 25 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1930). See also Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Ray. 997 (1966).
u3 Obstruction of a public highway has traditionally been considered a public
nuisance. The King v. Jones, 170 Eng. Rep. 1364 (N.P. 1812); The King v. Cross, 170
Eng. Rep. 1362 (N.P. 1812); The King v. Russell, 102 Eng. Rep. 1350 (K.B. 1805);
BACON's ABmunMEmN, Highways 675.
'3 See Maloney, Judicial Protection of the Environment: A New Role for Common
Law Remedies, 25 VAN. L. REv. 145, 147-48 (1972).
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duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney
General under the common law, except when modified by stat-
utory enactment. ' 87 At common law, the Attorney General
was the chief legal advisor of the Crown, responsible for the
management of all legal affairs and for the prosecution of all
suits, civil and criminal, in which the government was con-
cerned.88 It appears that in England the Attorney General could
seek injunctive relief against the maintenance of a public nuis-
ance, although criminal proceedings were more common.89
There is ample precedent for this in Kentucky as well."0 Having
concluded that the Attorney General could have brought a civil
action on behalf of the state against Terry Elkhorn, the Court
of Appeals held that the Rules of Civil Procedure would permit
him to intervene in the landowners' suit. 1
Finally, the defendant argued that the issuance of the in-
junction against continued violations of the load limit laws was
improper. As a general rule, courts will not enjoin the future
commission of a crime, because the criminal statute itself con-
stitutes an injunction.2 However, public nuisance is a civil
wrong as well as a crime, and equitable relief traditionally was
available at common law. In America, many courts have al-
91 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1942). This is in accord with
the weight of authority, see 7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorney General § 6 (1963). Contra, Cosson
v. Bradshaw, 141 N.W. 1062 (Iowa 1913); State ex rel. Thornton v. Williams, 336 P.2d
68 (Ore. 1959); State v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 116 N.W. 900 (Wis. 1908).
ISee generally W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAw (1922); T. PLUCKN=r,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 228-30 (5th ed. 1956).
89 Crowder v. Tinkler, 34 Eng. Rep. 645 (Ch. 1816); Attorney General v. Cleaver,
34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1811).
90 See, e.g., Respass v. Commonwealth, 115 S.W. 1131 (Ky. 1909); Bollinger v.
Commonwealth, 35 S.W. 553 (Ky. 1896).
"Ky. R. Civ. P. 24.01.
92 Commonwealth v. Ruh, 191 S.W. 498 (Ky. 1917).
'3 Shabaz, The Historical Development of The Power of Equity Courts To Enjoin
Nuisances, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 32 (1926). At common law an indictment for public
nuisance was tried at the assizes or in the Court of King's Bench. Upon conviction,
the court would order the nuisance abated. Hall's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 744 (K.B. 1671).
Suit for injunctive relief on the other hand was brought in Chancery. Only once prior
to the late eighteenth century did the Attorney General seek this remedy. Bonds Case,
72 Eng. Rep. 553 (K.B. 1587); Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin
Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. REv. 19, 20-21 (1913). It was doubted as
late as the early nineteenth century whether a court of equity had this power. Attorney
General v. Cleaver, 34 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1811); Mayor of London v. Bolt, 31 Eng.
Rep. 507 (Ch. 1799); Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARv. L. Ray. 389,395-
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lowed an Attorney General to institute proceedings to enjoin
the maintenance of a public nuisance even though the criminal
process may also be utilized. 4
This rule has often been recognized in Kentucky, at least
where the use of real property was concerned. 5 One of the
leading cases is Respass v. Commonwealth." After a series of
criminal convictions failed to remedy the condition, the state
sought to prevent the continued use of the defendant's property
for illegal betting on horse races on the theory that it consti-
tuted a public nuisance. The Court distinguished between pro-
hibiting the defendant from gambling and restraining the un-
lawful use of the property in question. The Court made this
same distinction in Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 11
another case involving the use of property for illegal gambling.
The Court held that there was a clear difference between en-
joining an individual from committing a crime and enjoining
him from using his property so as to create a nuisance.
In the Hancock case, the conduct at issue involved the
manner of transporting coal and not, strictly speaking, the use
of the defendant's land. It would seem, therefore, that Hancock
may represent a slight expansion of prior Kentucky law. It
should be noted that the defendants had not been convicted of
either maintaining a public nuisance or of violating the over-
weight truck law. While the equitable remedy sought here was
distinct from the relief commonly provided as part of the crimi-
nal process, it is interesting that in most of the earlier cases,
the defendants involved had previously been convicted in crim-
inal proceedings.
96 (1903); Note, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Equity-Purprestures and Other Public
Nuisances Affecting Health and Safety, 20 Ky. L.J. 163 (1931).
7 Am. Jun. 2D Attorney General § 19 (1963).
" Goose v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 205 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1947) (gam-
bling); Kentucky State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 281 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1926)
(unlicensed dentist); Respass v. Commonwealth, 115 S.W. 1131 (Ky. 1909) (gambling);
Ehrlik v. Commonwealth, 102 S.W. 289 (Ky. 1907) (gambling); Commonwealth v.
McGovern, 75 S.W. 261 (Ky. 1903) (illegal prize fight); Bollinger v. Commonwealth,
35 S.W. 553 (Ky. 1896) (gambling house); Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1
Bush) 139 (1866) (animal pen).
" 115 S.W. 1131 (Ky. 1909).
205 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1947).
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B. Private Nuisance
The interaction between exploitation of mineral rights and
the law of private nuisance was explored in Kentland-Elkhorn
Coal Co. v. Charles," a case in which a landowner brought a
private nuisance action for damages resulting from the opera-
tion of a coal preparation plant on an adjacent tract of land.
The defendant had acquired the mineral rights to both tracts
through a "broad form" deed.9
A private nuisance is anything which annoys or disturbs
the free use of one's property or which renders ordinary use or
physical occupation of the property uncomfortable." The ex-
istence of a nuisance must be ascertained by examining the
reasonableness of the defendant's use of his property and the
gravity of the harm to the landowner."' This involves a balanc-
ing of the social utility of the defendant's conduct against the
harm to the plaintiff's land."'2
In Kentucky, however, the owner of mineral rights under
the broad form deed is liable only for surface damages caused
by oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious action.' 3 Fur-
thermore, the fact that an operation would otherwise constitute
a private nuisance will not impose liability on the mineral
owner if a broad form deed is involved."'4 With this in mind,
the Court of Appeals first considered whether the defendant's
, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974).
" For a more extended discussion of the broad form deed in Kentucky, see Schnei-
der, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 KY. L.J. 652, 653-57 (1971); Note, Kentucky's
Experience with the Broad Form Deed, 63 KY. L.J. 107 (1974).
100 Adams v. Hamilton Carhartt Overall Co., 169 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1943);
Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1936).
101 Curry v. Farmers Livestock Mkt., 343 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1961); Louisville Ref.
Co. v. Mudd, 339 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1960).
102 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826, 827, 828 (1939). In George v. Standard Slag Co.,
431 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1968), the Court listed the following factors as relevant to the
question of whether a private nuisance existed: (1) the lawful nature and location of
the defendant's facility; (2) the manner of its operations; (3) its importance and influ-
ence on the growth and prosperity of the community; (4) the kind, volume and dura-
tion of the annoyance; (5) the respective relations of the parties; and (6) the character
and development of the neighborhood and the locality in which the properties are
located.
01 Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Buchanan
v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
I0 Tolliver v. Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Co., 290 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1956);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mann, 181 S.W.2d 394 (Ky. 1944).
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conduct was "oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious." The
Court distinguished between acts which were "necessary" to
remove the coal, and those which merely made its removal
more "convenient." Insofar as the defendant's acts are neces-
sary, in the sense that there is no other way in which to remove
the mineral, the mineral owner's right to perform those acts is
unqualified.105 However, in the case of acts done under a claim
of convenience, the conduct will be deemed "arbitrary, wanton
or malicious" if the mineral owner has chosen a harmful proce-
dure when one less harmful is equally available.
If the issue is one of "oppressive" conduct, however, the
concept of reasonableness becomes relevant. In Kentland-
Elkhorn, the plaintiff claimed that the coal preparation plant
was operated or maintained in an oppressive manner. The
Court invoked the concept of unreasonable harm developed in
the law of nuisance0 6 as a standard for determining whether the
defendant's conduct was "oppressive." The landowners showed
that the coal preparation plant cast dust over their residences
in such quantities that the property was rendered almost unin-
habitable. In addition, it appeared that on occasion the defen-
dant not only failed to operate the plant in a customary or
prudent manner, but also failed to make a reasonable effort to
minimize the harm. Accordingly, the Court held that it was
proper to submit the case to the jury on the unreasonable harm
theory.
The Court reversed, however, because of errors in the jury
instructions. One of these errors involved the issue of damages.
Damages for private nuisance can be either temporary or per-
manent. Temporary damages are based on the reduction in the
value of the use of the property during the continuance of the
nuisance (or in the case of rental property, the reduction in
rental value during that period). If a permanent nuisance is
involved, the measure of damages is the amount by which the
nuisance reduces the market value of the property."7
J Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960).
, The Court also discussed the use of this concept in water right cases. See
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Baird, 444 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1969); Klutney v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967).
I Adams Constr. Co. v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1960); Fidelity Trust Co.
v. Shelbyville Water and Light Co., 110 S.W. 239 (Ky. 1908).
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The Court of Appeals employed two tests to determine
whether the private nuisance was temporary or permanent.
Under one approach a nuisance is permanent if it cannot be
readily corrected or abated at reasonable expense," 8 while
under the other test a nuisance may be regarded as permanent
if the offending structure will be relatively enduring and is not
likely to be abated, either voluntarily or by court order." 9
The offending structure met the test of a permanent nuis-
ance under the first criterion because it was not economically
feasible to eliminate the excessive emission of dust by modify-
ing the coal preparation plant. However, under the second ap-
proach, the nuisance was considered temporary because the
plant was scheduled to close within a year and a half after the
case went to trial. Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that
the nuisance was temporary and reversed the trial court, which
had found the nuisance to be permanent. The Court also re-
versed on the ground that damages for personal annoyance,
discomfort or sickness on the part of the landowners were not
recoverable as a separate element of damages, but were neces-
sarily included in the damages for dimunition in the value of
the use of the property, unless a specific claim of damages for
personal injury was made."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stephenson rejected the
dual test of the majority and urged that "the rights of the
parties should be resolved under the law of minerals with re-
spect to the rights of the surface owner whose improvements
are damaged by the conduct of the mining operation.""' Ac-
cording to Justice Stephenson, early cases in Kentucky distin-
guished between damage to improved, as opposed to unim-
proved property, insofar as liability of the owner of the mineral
estate was concerned."2 The present rule, enunciated by the
Court in Buchanan v. Watson"' in 1956, was not applied to
10 City of Ashland v. Kittle, 305 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1957).
'" Kentucky-Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling, 95 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1936).
,, City of Hazard v. Eversole, 133 S.W.2d 906 (Ky. 1939); Gay v. Perry, 265 S.W.
437 (Ky. 1924).
" 514 S.W.2d at 665.
12 Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co. v. Crum, 80 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1935); McIntire v.
Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921).
11 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
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improved property until Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace"4 in
1960. Justice Stephenson regarded the Buchanan requirement
of oppressive, arbitrary, wanton or malicious conduct as too
narrow a test for liability to the surface estate where improve-
ments to the land were involved. Instead, he suggested that the
Court "impose strict liability for damages to the surface own-
ers' improvements, improved property and merchantable tim-
ber occasioned by the conduct of a mining operation."'15
Despite various efforts at governmental regulation, 8 the
institutional framework has not induced the coal industry to
minimize its social and environmental costs. Consequently,
externalities have occurred which are borne, not by the con-
sumers of coal, but largely by residents of the mining regions.
1 7
Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co. and Kentland-Elkhorn
Coal Co. v. Charles provide examples of this situation. The law
of nuisance could be used to correct such externalities by re-
quiring coal producers to compensate those who are damaged
as a result of their mining activities."' Moreover, it would seem
that coal producers could easily spread these costs to the gen-
eral public in the form of higher prices for their product. Thus,
both the resource allocation and the cost-spreading objectives
appear to support a rule which would place the initial entitle-
ment in the surface owner rather than the mineral owner.1
Decisions such as Buchanan v. Watson, which limit the liabil-
ity of coal producers whose activities give rise to nuisance
conditions, cannot be justified in terms of sound public policy.
The approach advocated by Justice Stephenson in his concur-
ring opinions seems more promising.
"1 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960). See also Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429
S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
" 514 S.W.2d at 667.
"' KRS ch. 350. See Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L.J. 652, 657-
64 (1971); Note, Reclamation of Strip Mine Spoils, 50 Ky. L.J. 524, 544-65 (1962).
"I Howard, Measurement of the External Diseconomies Associated with Bitumi-
nous Coal Surface Mining, Eastern Kentucky-1962-1967, 11 NAT. Ras. J. 76 (1971).
I' Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 534-41 (1961).
"' Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Calabresi, Transaction Costs,
Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 67 (1968);
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
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